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Background
Bangladesh is basically a low lying flat land country, is endowed with enormous inland 
fishery resources which contribute a significant part of freshwater fish production. 
Inland fisheries in Bangladesh contain different types of water bodies’ character e.g. 
flowing rivers, beel—usually deeper depression in the floodplain, haor—extensive low 
lying areas comprising several perennial beels and baor or oxbow lakes or dead rivers 
that have lost their connectivity with the main stream. To assess the status of fisher-
ies resources and current management practices and to test and access alternative local 
fishery management arrangement that might achieve greater efficiency, equity and sus-
tainability a Community Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) was established in inland 
fisheries sector in Bangladesh (Sultana and Thompson, 2000).
Inland fisheries management is complex by its physical condition and variety of stake-
holder’s involvement in resource exploitation process. About four million hectare of 
open water in Bangladesh are the rivers, beels (permanent and seasonal lakes and wet-
lands), baors (oxbow lakes), haors (large deeply flooded depressions), and floodplains 
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provides more than 264 fish species (Rahman, 2005). Government of Bangladesh made 
waterbody management policy for conservation, increased production and bio diversity 
conservation of fisheries resources as well as leasing government waterbodies in favour 
of real fishers, and earn revenue. Present waterbody leasing policy does not provide 
secured access of the fisher communities and management. Policy allowing influential 
people to back different fisher groups to leased by bidding in a tender process but would 
limit opportunities to bestow political patronage.
Waterbody leasing policy had changed over time. In 1984 waterbodies ranging from 
3–20 acres were under the jurisdiction of Upazila1 Nirbahi Officers (UNO), while water-
bodies more than 20 acres were placed with Additional Deputy Commissioner (ADC) 
Revenue under jurisdiction of the Ministry of Land (MoL). The first move towards open 
water fisheries management started in 1985 through the introduction of New Fisheries 
Management Policy (NFMP) to secure better access right to the “genuine fisheries” by 
identifying real fishermen. In 1994 Government adopted a policy to transfer manage-
ment of smaller waterbodies to the local Government bodies (Union Parishad,2 Munici-
palities and City corporations). In 1997 smaller waterbodies (up to 20 acres) were 
transferred to the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MoYS) to create income opportunities 
for youth societies, but this initiative was unable to achieve its target due to vested inter-
ested groups created fake youth societies to grab these resources (Huda 2003). The main 
fisheries policy changed in 1995 by declaring “free access to open waterbodies” in order 
to remove difficulties faced by fisher groups. However, this declaration made open water 
fisheries management more difficult, as local muscle men took advantage of the open 
access by excluding poor people from the resources thus, unlimited access for fishing 
was established. In Bangladesh fisheries users can be divided into three categories—full-
time professional fisher, part time seasonal fisher and subsistence fisher fish for 
consumption.
In most cases fisheries management initiatives not sustained due to improper iden-
tification of fisher categories. Most of the policy adopted by the government to admin-
ister fisheries resources properly, while, existing wide range of interest groups gain 
illegal benefits from these fisheries. However, various management approaches have 
been attempted to enhance fisheries returns.
The purpose of this paper is to provide background information on the fisheries of 
Bangladesh and to justify the implementation of community-based fisheries manage-
ment (CBFM) as vital if sustainable solutions are to be found.
Method
The present paper assesses various community based projects and polices of the govern-
ment of Bangladesh. The Improved Management of Open Water Fisheries project from 
1991 to 1994 was first piloted in through the concept on community based management. 
The later CBFM Phase I and II, Community Based Fisheries Management in South and 
South East Asia (CBFM-SSEA), SCBRMP, Fourth Fisheries Project (FFP) and Manage-
ment of Aquatic Ecosystems through Community Husbandry (MACH) projects were 
1 An Upazila is the sub-district level administrative unit.
2 Union Parishad is the smallest administrative unit.
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subsequently developed (Thompson and Hossain 1998, Thompson et al. 1999, Thomp-
son 2004, Thompson et al. 2004, Dickson and Usha 2006, Dickson 2006, Khan and Mid-
dendrop 2006, Kuperan et al. 2003, IFAD 2006, Mustafa et al. 2007). A list of assessed 
projects those has been completed between 1991 and 2014 is presented in Table 1.
Simultaneously the prospects and problems of open water fisheries management are 
identified from the publication, project reports, and gray literature as well as from the 
field. Possible guidelines for improved governess have been proposed in conclusion and 
recommendation.
Review
Challenges of the community‑based fisheries
Projects finding reveals that inland capture fisheries resources are ensuring food, income, 
and employment of millions of poor people in the developing countries like Bangladesh. 
However, these vital resources are under high pressure, and over-exploitation and deg-
radation of habitat, and often ignored the socio economic aspects fisheries. Hence, com-
munity-based management approach introduced to countries face major constraints in 
capacity and the ability to promote implementation of long-term sustainable policies. 
Table 1 Projects involving communities and inland fisheries management of Bangladesh
Project name Donor Executed organization Duration
Improved management  
of open water fisheries
Ford foundation DoF, WorldFish (previous 
ICLARM), BRAC, Proshika and 
friends in village development
1991–1994
Oxbow lakes small scale fisher-
men’s project-phase II
IFAD and DANIDA DoF and BRAC 1991–1997
Compartmentalization pilot 
project (CPP)
GOB, FRG and the Dutch BWDB and a number of NGOs at 
different times
1991–2000
Community based fisheries devel-
opment and habitat restoration 
project-phase I
Ford foundation CNRS and Proshika 1994–1997
Community based fisheries man-
agement (CBFM)-phase I
Ford foundation DoF, worldfish (previous ICLARM), 
Caritas, Proshika, BRAC and 
Banchte Shekha
1995–1999
Management of aquatic eco-
systems through community 
husbandry project (MACH)
USAID Winrock international, DoF, BCAS, 
CNRS and Caritas
1998–2008
Dampara water improvement 
project
GOB and CIDA BWDB, DoF, NACOM and Tara 1998–2001
Fourth fisheries project (inland 
fisheries component)
GOB, IDA, GEF, DFID  
and beneficiaries




agement program (fisheries 
component)
UNDP DoF, IUCN, CNRS, NACOM and 
BCAS
2000–2003
Community based fisheries man-
agement in south and south 
East Asia (CBFM-SSEA)
IFAD DoF, WorldFish (previous 
ICLARM), ERA, SUJON
2001–2007
Community based fisheries man-
agement (CBFM)-phase II
DFID WorldFish (previous ICLARM), 
DoF, BELA, BRAC, CNRS, 
Banchte Sheka, Caritas, Fem-
com and Proshika
2001–2006
Sunamganj community based 
resource management project 
(fisheries component)
GOB and IFAD LGED, MoL, DoF, DAE, DoL, BKB, 
worldfish and local NGOs
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International concern about people and their resources has significantly impacted 
thinking about how fisheries should be managed and the need for greater responsibil-
ity by fishers and managers is becoming more frequently heard. This situation urgently 
requires effective management measures which can be best achieved by involving all 
user groups and the national fisheries agency, as the leader of the managers, for long 
term success oriented ultimately towards societal well-being, and based upon economic 
and resource sustainability. However, the involvement of fishers in management is in 
many cases limited to consultation on implementation issues, but may also involve the 
development of shared understandings and knowledge basis for management.
Policy level
Government policy always meant for common resources enhancement to eradicate 
poverty. Thus policy should hinder influential people to extract resources for their own 
interest, however, in reality present policy does not support poor people, musclemen are 
grabbing in association with politicians.
Waterbody leasing policy had been changed in different years and mostly starts from 
1984 in Bangladesh. Waterbodies ranging from 3–20 acres were under the jurisdiction of 
Upazila (sub-district) Nirbahi (executive) Officer (UNO) while water bodies more than 
20 acres had been placed with ADC Revenue at district level and directed by the MoL.
The first move towards inland open water fisheries management started in 1985 with 
the introduction of the NFMP. Under the new policy the lease money would be fixed at 
10 % above average revenue for the previous 3 years from the concerned waterbodies 
(Jalmahal). The Department of Fisheries was responsible for collecting lease money and 
ensuring conservation of fisheries resources. District level committees under the chair-
manship of the Deputy Commissioner (DC) and a national level committee under the 
chairmanship of the Secretary, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock (MOFL) were set up 
with detailed terms of reference for guidance, supervision and monitoring of the opera-
tion of the NFMP. This policy initially applied to a limited number of waterbodies on an 
experimental basis, but before the system could take root it was virtually abandoned by 
a government declaration in 1995 which granted open access to inland open waterbod-
ies mostly flowing rivers. Subsequent analysis of the experiment has shown the poten-
tial of the NFMP in securing access to the majority of the fishers. The introduction of a 
licensing system for conferring fishing rights to genuine fishers provided a sound pol-
icy framework on the basis of which an access system could have been developed. The 
NFMP had the effect of drawing the attention of government officials to the potential to 
break the existing hierarchy at different levels of the government, but it is apparent that 
government officials are preferred to collect revenues from a handful of fisher leaders 
rather than helping poor fishers for the fisheries management in general.
Simultaneously Government had undertaken another policy for inland open water 
fisheries management in 1994, and decided to transfer smaller waterbodies (under 3 
acres) to the Local Government bodies (Union Parishad, Municipalities and City Cor-
porations). Another management decision undertaken by the Government in 1997 was 
to transfer smaller water bodies up to (20 acres) to the MoYS to create income oppor-
tunities for youth societies. However, this initiative was not properly implemented by 
the local ‘youth societies’ which were used as a front by influential groups who formed 
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‘youth societies’ as a front for gaining control over all smaller water bodies, with the 
result that the goal of the policy was not achieved.
The policy shift in 1995 was the most controversial among all inland capture fisheries 
policies. The main motive of the declaration was to remove the difficulties faced by fisher 
groups. However, since 1995 the end to leasing and resultant free access in flowing riv-
ers has encouraged overfishing and locally powerful people and fishers have been able to 
gain control over section of river and have invested more heavily in boats and destruc-
tive fishing gears such as fish aggregating devices (FADs), (Mustafa, 2009). This system 
made open water fisheries management more difficult, and encouraged the indiscrimi-
nate exploitation of open water fisheries resources. The policy created uneven competi-
tion between local muscle men and poor fishers, with the effect that musclemen were 
able to take advantage of open access, and poor fishers were adversely affected as they 
could not compete with against the more powerful class of people. The unlimited access 
for fishing fosters unlimited mismanagement.
The system of awarding leases with duration of 1–3  years to the highest bidder is 
essentially incompatible with conservation since it encourages maximum exploitation in 
the short term as there is no incentive to invest in conservation for the future (Huda, 
2003). Besides, lack of awareness by the resource user, manpower by the law enforcing 
agencies, inter-organizational conflicts etc., are the major concern averting the law in 
enforce (Naser 2014).
Waterbody leasing procedure
Historically government has adopted a revenue-oriented leasing method for inland 
capture fisheries. Under the existing leasing system genuine fishermen are deprived 
of fishing rights as they are unable to compete against wealthy middlemen in the bid-
ding processes. In order to secure fishing rights fishermen must pay money or a share of 
their catch to the lease holder. Due to the short term nature of the leasing systems, the 
lease holders do not derive any incentive to undertake conservation measures; rather 
they harvest as much fish as possible in order to obtain maximum benefit. Furthermore, 
the overall contribution of waterbodies to government revenue is nominal and in 2000 
contributed only about 0.07 % of total government revenue (BBS 2001). Table 2 shows 
that the revenue from waterbodies larger than 20 acres from 1997 to 2001 (Huda 2003). 
However, despite the limited importance of leases as a source of government revenue, 
Table 2 Revenue earnings from  Jalmahal above  20 Acres during  Bengali year (B.S) 
of 1404–1408 B.S (Million Taka, I USD = 78 Taka) in Bangladesh
Source: ministry of land, government of Bangladesh
B.S. Bengali year
Name of the division 1404 B.S 1405 B.S 1406 B.S 1407 B.S 1408 B.S
Dhaka 3.67 0.451 4.43 4.78 4.52
Chittagong 0.912 0.861 0.993 1.26 1.26
Rajshahi 0.972 1.092 1.30 1.41 1.54
Khulna 5.63 1.564 1.31 1.60 1.62
Sylhet 6.71 6.436 7.69 6.34 6.64
Barisal 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.065
Total (taka) 17.93 10.45 15.78 15.44 15.68
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the ability of elected officials to grant leases to favoured individuals or groups is impor-
tant securing political backing at the local level, meaning that there is little incentive to 
adopt policies with better management outcomes.
Inconsistency in fixation lease value
The system for determining lease values has creates scope for misappropriation of 
resources by some vested interest groups in government and society at large. Table 3 and 
4 provides an example of lease cost variability from two large community-based fisheries 
management projects. In the CBFM-2 project there is a big variation in revenue collec-
tion ranging from Taka 53–42,455/ha in 2002–2003.
Inconsistency of lease value setting is still persisting. The SCBRMP was the biggest 
fisheries management project in Bangladesh. Fixation of land revenue in the SCBRMP’s 
waterbodies has not been made in a transparent manner; this procedure neither fol-
lowed criteria based on bio-logical productivity nor waterbody area. This poverty alle-
viation project has had to pay the incremental lease value along with value added tax, 
thus Table 4 shows a wide variation of lease value among waterbodies, with the result 
that some lease values are very high while others are very low.
Mechanisms in setting the value of leases
The productivity of a waterbody varies greatly depending on geographical region, 
physical characteristics, fisheries biology, and the variable extent of water in any given 
year, while, the number of fishing households dependent these resources have no fixed 
Table 3 Lease values of selected waterbodies under CBFM-2 project in Bangladesh
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relationship with area or production. Besides, current leasing arrangements fail to sup-
port the aim of sustainable and equitable management by fishers.
There is no defined mechanism for adjusting lease value down to a reasonable level 
when waterbodies are transferred to a project. MoL claims a 25  % higher lease value 
over its previous rate when this happens. Whereas, there are many examples of massive 
mismanagement of the leasing system and corrupt practices that surround it. Govern-
ment is losing revenue on two ways: firstly a handful numbers of waterbodies remain 
unsettled for leasing for several years consecutively. Secondly, influential people backed 
by the politicians do not allow anyone to drop the schedule for competing in the tender 
process. This situation creates opportunity for the revenue department officials to fix 
least value and present considerable loss of government revenue.
There is lack in right information on productivity of waterbodies; a perfect market in 
bidding process is not yet developed. As a result, past bidding is not a sound basis for 
fixing lease values for fisheries to be managed by communities; it just provides a basis 
of the past lease value which preserves government revenue rates. It is expected that 
evidence including information on production and income levels at the waterbody and 
household levels will guide overall policy decisions on effective and sustainable fish-
ery management benefiting poor people. However, in the short term there is a need to 
provide an enabling environment for the communities managing waterbodies without 
excess levels of government revenue being levied which can prevent fishers from earn-
ing enough to make conservation and sustainable management. The actual lease values 
in some water bodies have been summarized in Table 5. Based on this there is a strongly 
skewed range of leases in per ha terms with a few very high leases pushing the mean up.
Table 4 Examples of  lease values of  selected waterbodies under  SCBRMP in  Sunamganj, 
Bangladesh
SL. no. Name of the  
water body
Water body  
area (ha)




1 Terazani Balir Dubi 1.72 20,867 1480
2 Sudam khali river 3.48 8276 351
3 Chinamara beel and Gozaria 
Dohor
1.23 7479 365
4 Aislauni Prokashito Mitar Dubi 1.55 7187 429
5 Ghotghatia Nodhi 6.73 5706 116
6 Srinathpurer Dhola 3.56 1551 28
7 Moinpur Beel Group 4.75 1162 251
8 Babonpai Beel 12.74 824 83
9 Basker Khal 4.7 454 142
10 Boiragimara Beel 18.7 428 124
Table 5 Lease values in  CBFM-2 waterbodies (Jalmahal) where  revenue were collected 
(2000–2001) from the project area
Water body type Total number Average lease value (Tk. per ha) Range lease 
value (Tk. per ha)
Closed beel 14 3057 36–28,781
Open beel 22 2011 215–8857
River 3 780 236–1833
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It is not clear what should be done to address the inconsistencies regarding revenue 
collection from rivers. Evidence suggests that there some rivers with under NFMP for 
which revenue has been deposited, while from others revenues are not collected. Infor-
mation from a small number of water bodies should not be used as the basis for fixing 
lease values more widely.
Finally, though the contribution of waterbodies to the total government revenue 
is insufficient in terms of total income, these resources have high importance to local 
elite and government officials. In this regard recommended fisheries management pro-
cedures based on sound biological management to ensure sustainability through con-
servation measures is rarely achieved. Rather practices of overexploitation and habitat/
wetland loss will continue to occur as they did in the past. It is suggested that, whatever 
the type of waterbody, an area should be set aside by the community as a permanent fish 
sanctuary then there should be a reduction in the lease value. This will encourage com-
munities to protect part of their water bodies as fish sanctuaries.
Value added tax (vat) and income tax
Some inequitable rules have been imposed regarding tax revenue earnings from water-
bodies. For example the lease value of a water body leased out to a project will be based 
on the previous year’s lease price plus an additional 25 % in the first year. In addition, 
fishers also have to pay 15 % VAT and 3 % income tax for each water body leased. The 
increase in VAT and income tax places an additional burden on poor fishers. National 
taxable net income is now Tk.160,000 per year but most of the fishers involve in fishery 
management live below subsistence level.
This matter had been debated in various fora but no change has occurred. There are 
serious institutional constraints facing the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock and 
Department of Fisheries in this regard as the power to issue leases rests belongs to the 
Ministry of Land and Ministry of finance (MoF). A thorough review is therefore neces-
sary in order to assess the condition of the resources lease, the income and welfare con-
ditions of the fishers and revenue needs of Government. It is notable that the acceptable 
price for access to a government waterbody for a single entrepreneur with no interest in 
long-term sustainability of resource use may be much greater than the lease value that 
a poor community participating in fishery management with the intention of ensuring 
resource sustainability without short term over-exploitation and sharing the benefits 
among many fishing households is able to afford.
Social barriers
The distribution of benefits arising from fisheries depends on correct identification 
of stakeholders such as genuine fishers. In Bangladesh a wide range of interest groups 
use or gain benefits from fisheries. The prime users of fisheries resources include fish-
ers, waterbody lessees, inhabitants of nearby communities, and local elites. In addition, 
various enhancement and management approaches are complicated by traditional atti-
tudes towards women’s’ involvement in open water fisheries management. In most areas 
women are not encouraged to participate in community based management, with a few 
exceptions found in CBOs organized by projects (Thompson et al. 2001). Female partici-
pation in CBOs is low and most CBOs women have no position at the highest level of 
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leadership. Social barriers may therefore act to exclude certain resource users who are 
directly or indirectly depend on fisheries.
Stakeholders
Sustainable inland fisheries management program need to correctly identify the stake-
holders who will participate in management activities. However, due to diverse character 
of waterbodies in different regions of Bangladesh and the communities that depend on 
them is difficult to make define separate categories of stakeholder for fisheries manage-
ment. As a result, ensuring access to fisheries resources by the appropriate stakeholders 
is a critical factor in ensuring the effectiveness of interventions. Despite the community 
based initiatives of different projects, fishery management is widely influenced by people 
from other more powerful social classes who are not directly dependent the resources 
themselves. Fishers are therefore often unable to establish their right to access water-
bodies since the rural power elite are in a better position to maintain their access with 
low transaction costs by using their social connections, and the poor therefore lose out 
(Toufique 2000).
Fishers
Historically, fishing is an occupation and principal source of livelihood associated with 
certain communities. These groups are the key plays in fisheries management. Generally 
in Bangladesh fishers are categorized into three broad groups namely, professional or 
full-time fisher, seasonal or part-time fisher and subsistence fisher or occasional fisher. 
Ensuring access to fishery resources by the appropriate stakeholders is an important fac-
tor in successful fisheries management. Despite the community based initiatives of vari-
ous projects, fishery management remains widely influenced by classes of people who 
are not direct users of fishery resources. As a result, fishers are often unable to establish 
theirs right to waterbodies. In contrast, the rural power elite is better placed to main-
tain access rights with lower transaction costs by using their social connections at the 
expense of the poor (Toufique 2000).
Lease holders
During the British colonial regime 1793 waterbodies were under the control of Zaminder 
(landlords). At that time fish stocks were abundant and revenue was collected mainly 
from land. In 1951 the Zamindari system was abolished and the Department of Rev-
enue under the MOL assumed the responsibility for all Jalmohals outside Reserved For-
est areas. The first initiative to give access right poor fishers was taken in 1965. In 1974 
preference was given to co-operative societies registered with the Dept of Co-operatives. 
However, this provision created ill practice as a result of leaseholders using co-ops as 
fronts in order to take Jalmohals on sublease arrangements and retain effective control 
of the fishery. In 1980 government ordered the handover of all Jalmohals from MOL to 
the MOFL.
However, in 1983 before this new management system was fully implemented gov-
ernment shifted to another policy under which waterbodies less than 20 acres were 
transferred to the newly formed Upazila Parishad (sub-district councils) as a means of 
augmenting their income, whilst those over 20 acres reverted to MOL control, although 
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with 50  % of the income accruing from these earmarked for Upazila Parishad. The 
NFMP was adopted in 1986 to provide access to genuine poor fishers and promote fish-
eries management and conservation in association with the Department of Fisheries 
(DOF). About 400 waterbodies were brought under this management system. Another 
shift in waterbody management took place in 1991, when a tendering procedure was 
introduced among fishers society for the leasing of Jalmahal. None of these policy shifts 
created positive impacts on fish catch and bio-diversity as leaseholders’ main intention 
in each instance continued to be profit maximization. In order to ensure this outcome 
leaseholders employ middlemen (sub-lessees) or local musclemen to exclude real fish-
ers in the fishing process. This enables them to use illegal fishing practices to extract the 
highest yields of fishes wherever possible.
Community members
Communities located close to most waterbodies are mixed in terms of the combina-
tion of different professions (e.g. farmers, fishers, agricultural and non agricultural day 
laborers, full-time workers in formal employment, and businessmen). The outcomes of 
various CBFM projects show that socially more homogenous communities are generally 
more effective for fisheries management. In most communities where waterbody users 
reside, few households are truly traditional full time professional fishers or converted 
to fishing. Other people engage in a variety of other related and non-related economic 
activities, while many people catch fish seasonally for food and/or income. Some land-
owners convert floodplain land into ditches for trapping fish during the monsoon and 
harvest for consumption or income in winter.
Local elites
In most cases control over natural resources has not been devolved to the poor fish-
ers or even the middle strata of communities due to elite capture of these resources. 
Open water fisheries have been controlled by a small number of powerful elite’s, who 
had developed good connections with local government officials and thus obtained a 
disproportionate share of power (David Lewis 2008). At the same time, the fishers with 
whom community based management projects work are often helplessly caught up in 
the meshes of this invisible network which they only partially understand, and possess 
only a very small amount of power. Thus poor fishers and other community members 
are excluded from the decision making process.
Role of local government institution
The existing practice of co-management depends heavily on the establishment of local 
institutions such as Community Based Organizations (CBOs). Ensuring the sustain-
ability of these institutions requires capacity building initiatives in order to support the 
development of democratic practices, establish and fiscal discipline and the participation 
of other local level institutions. The project therefore aimed to improve the management 
capacities of CBOs using both formal and informal methods of knowledge dissemina-
tion such as discussions, meetings and training. The project aimed to create a network of 
CBOs with a view to developing a sustainable institution, encouraging dissemination of 
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fishery management information and enabling these organizations to respond to various 
issues efficiently and effectively.
Conclusion
This study concludes that open water fisheries management through community 
involvement has promising future. However, despite the successes, a number of chal-
lenges were also evident and need to be noted for overcome the hinderers. These ben-
efits and constraints are summarized below as initiatives for overcoming the challenges.
  • Open water fisheries development activities were undertaken through the partner-
ship of NGOs, Government and an international research institute working to assess 
the impacts of these approaches (particularly on poor people and fishers), their 
sustainability (institutional, social, economic, and biological), and the potential for 
expansion.
  • Regular project activities to identify test and assess co-ordination and administration 
mechanisms for community management arrangements within larger fishery and 
wetland systems. Based on the view that for CBFM to be effective in the long term 
and over larger areas, but it will need to operate within co-management frameworks 
that help distinct user communities share information and experiences and coordi-
nate their management activities.
  • CBFM works to inform and influence all fisheries policy stakeholders of improved 
management approaches. For this there are a mixture of policy and communication 
studies, legal studies and advice, and media development for awareness rising at dif-
ferent levels.
  • CBFM has been developed and tested a range of community based fisheries manage-
ment approaches and models in different types of water bodies for overcoming the 
challenges. Three models have been identified for managing inland open water fish-
eries. These are, Fisher managed fishery, Community managed fishery and women 
managed fishery.
  • The community Based Fisheries Management Project has addressed and mobilized 
the communities and local government for open water management and to put for-
ward for habitat restoration and conservation in an attempt to link micro and macro 
levels of stakeholders. Otherwise the huge potential of open water fisheries sector 
will be overexploited and destroyed for the increasing population of Bangladesh.
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